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INTRODUcMION
MARK TUSHNET*

This collection of articles and essays on the frontiers of legal
thought' shows the ways in which some aspects of legal thought have
developed in the past decade. 2 Building on the insights of the American
Legal Realists but rejecting many of their political positions and policy

prescriptions as well as their fondness for the "scientifization" of law, 3
scholars associated with critical legal studies began a project that continues to evolve-a project which has been transformed by its interaction
with the work of minority and feminist scholars. Many of the themes in
this new, "critical/feminist/minority/post-modernist" scholarship 4 are
found in the articles and essays here.
At the risk of simplification and distortion, I would suggest that a
decade or so ago essays of this sort would have exhibited a number of
characteristics, only some of which are represented in this collection.
First, there would have been some methodological prescriptions. Legal
doctrines would have been described in a way that showed how each
doctrine represented a logically unstable solution to problems posed by
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Or at least on some of the frontiers of legal thought; no one would contend that this collection touches exhaustively on the topics or methods of contemporary legal analysis.
2. Many of these essays, along with others, were presented at a conference at the Duke Law
School on January 25-27, 1990, sponsored by Duke's Forum for Legal Alternatives (FLA), the Duke
Law Journal,and about a dozen other university and law school groups. As a participant in the
conference, I would like to note my appreciation to the FLA, Tony Taibi, and Dana Lesemann for
putting together an exciting event. FrontiersofLegal Thought will appear as three consecutive issues
of the Duke Law Journal FrontiersofLegal Thought II & III [hereinafter FrontiersII and Frontiers
III] are forthcoming.
3. Though I note that some residue of that affection can be found in the essay by Elizabeth
Mensch & Alan Freeman, Efficiency and Image: Advertising as an Antitrust Issue, 1990 DUKE L.J.
321, which appears to take some comfort from the fact that "even" some mathematicians have
adopted approaches similar to the ones they commend.
4. I use this locution to suggest that, though no single tradition dominates the field, there is an
identifiable grouping of legal thought represented here.
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the coexistence of competing values all of which deserved protection to
the fullest, but none of which could be so protected. In addition, the
logical demonstration would have been accompanied by an insistence on
the proposition that legal doctrines ought to be understood not as the
product of some abstract logic, but rather as a form of life that simultaneously ratified and provided the opportunity for transformation of the
status quo.
Second, there would have been a political stance implicit in the topics chosen for analysis, but it would have differed somewhat from the
political stance implicit in the selection of topics in this collection. Because critical scholars were attempting to revive the Realist tradition as
they understood it, they focused on the terrain most important to the
structure of the legal academy-the first-year curriculum. Analyzing the
structure of the basic common law subjects and constitutional law was
important to establish the significance of the enterprise. Other areas,
such as labor law and race discrimination, were addressed because the
subjects 5 were thought to be of particular political concern.
The essays in this collection continue along the lines of work I have
briefly described above, and they simultaneously shift our attention and
deepen our knowledge. All participate in the project of logical deconstruction. Rudolph Peritz's A Counter-Historyof Antitrust Law, 6 as its
title indicates, plays competition policy and protection of private property policies against each other in offering an interpretation of the development of antitrust policy that shifts attention from more traditional
"6consumer welfare vs. populism" analysis. David Millon, in describing
Theories of the Corporation,7 examines the history of the ways that corporations have been conceptualized, and he concludes the essay by discussing the Delaware Chancery Court's analysis in the Time8 takeover
case. A key to his analysis is the "public/private" distinction in corporation law.
Peritz and Millon continue the project of deconstruction, extending
its reach while using now-familiar tools. Yet, their essays and the others
in this collection have moved beyond the essential first step of demonstrating the logical inadequacy of the categories typically used to analyze
legal problems. If these essays share a single characteristic, I would say
it is their insistence that legal doctrines and categories must be histori5. In both senses.
6. 1990 DuKE L.L 263.
7. 1990 DuKE L.J. 201.
8. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 94,514 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %94,938 (Del. 1990).
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cized. 9 That is, the logical demonstrations are insufficient because, as we
all know, at any particular time lawyers are convinced that the structure
of legal thought within which they are implicated is just about as logically coherent as anyone could reasonably expect. The incompatibility
between the logical analysis and the experience of lawyers itself needs
explanation. For the authors of these essays, the primary form of that
explanation is the demonstration of the historical circumstances in which
lawyers came to believe that there was no tension between their experience and the logic of the law.
For example, Millon analyzes the various concepts implicated in the
construction of a law of corporations which routinely have been
thought to go in lock-step with one another. He shows, however, that
the actual practice of the legal theory of the corporation is better described as "mix and match": As we examine the history of theories of
the corporation we find that individual lawyers, judges, and scholars essentially endorsed all of the possible arrays of concepts at some point or
another, even though adherents of each array contend that substituting
even one item in the array would be logically ridiculous. Similarly, in
their essay Efficiency and Image: Advertising as an Antitrust Issue, 10
Elizabeth Mensch and Alan Freeman relate an episode in the evolution
of antitrust policy in which the possibility of imposing antitrust liability
for certain types of advertising that foreclosed competition was briefly
considered, only to be rejected as incompatible with the true economic
foundations of antitrust; they too emphasize the historical nature of the
categories of economic analysis that many today take as grounded in the
science of economics.
The project of historicizing the categories of legal analysis is not,
however, without its pitfalls. We are, after all, trained as lawyers and not
as historians, and our ability to pull off the historical project is less well
developed than our ability to pull off the project of logical deconstruction. I suspect that much of the persuasiveness of the historicizing project will arise from a sort of allusive "culture critique" of the sort
introduced by the Freeman-Mensch story about cereal boxes.' More
12
extended analyses are likely to prove more difficult.
9. 1 believe that the program of treating doctrines and categories historically was both stated
in and implied clearly by the critical work of the 1970s to which I have referred, but the essays here
are significantly more self-conscious about the necessity of that program.
10. Mensch & Freeman, supra note 3.
11. Id. at 321-22, 372.
12. For example, I find the Freeman-Mensch discussion of "jeans," id. at 365-66, drawing on
the work of certain "culture critics," wildly implausible. (I offer this and some other criticisms in
this Introduction as a participant in the exploration of the frontiers of legal thought, and to demon-
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A second difficulty may reside in the form of the project itself. As
Peritz notes in his discussion of the term "genealogy," 1 3 these essays deal
with structures of legal thought that, for analytic purposes, must in some
sense be frozen in time, like the slices of cell tissue preserved for the
electron microscope. Two problems, then, are likely to arise. First, if
legal thought is dynamic, then constructing structures to analyze the process necessarily distorts the phenomenon even as it allows us to get some
grasp on it. Second, and perhaps of greater importance for the historicizing project, by dealing with successive structures-as in Peritz's discussion of "periods"-we may develop a "comparative statics" of legal
thought but be unable to develop a truly historical understanding of the
dynamics of transformation.
The historization of legal thought is the first characteristic of these
essays. A second characteristic is a shift in the topics addressed. Most
dramatically, of course, several of the essays deal not with the topics
covered in first-year courses, but rather with the topics covered in second- and third-year courses. And the essays on public law issues do not
take the topics covered in introductory courses as their direct focus of
concern. I take this shift to be a demonstration of the extension of the
frontiers of legal thought: The essays explore new domains without, of
course, suggesting that we have completely mapped the areas of law that
were the focus of earlier work.14
In Encounters on the Frontiersof InternationalHuman Rights Law:
Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 15
Robert Williams brings to the discussion of rights the perspective of indigenous peoples throughout the world who have attempted to mobilize
the human rights community on their own behalf. Gerald Torres and
Kathryn Milun offer an American example of the difficulties of the enterprise in their discussion, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case,1 6 which deals with a celebrated
lawsuit that raised issues of the "survival" and "continuity" of an indigenous people. In focusing on the problems of "translation," Torres and
Milun suggest a new twist on the critical discussion of the language of
rights, and thereby complement Williams' essay.
strate that, like every reader of these essays, I must engage with them and not merely appreciate
them.)

13. Peritz, supra note 6, at 268, 315.
14. Leslie Bender's essay, Feminist (Re)Torts Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power, andResponsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. - (forthcoming FrontiersII), discussed in more detail
later in this Introduction, is a good example of a deepened treatment of a topic covered in first-year
courses.

15. 1990 DUKE L.J. 16. 1990 DUKE L.J. -

(forthcoming Frontiers111).
(forthcoming FrontiersIII).
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Taking the two essays together, I am led to think that Iwould now
augment my presentation of the critique of rights. 17 I would now suggest
that the language of rights, as it is used by the international human rights
community and by the domestic legal community, is part of the legacy of
Eurocentric domination of legal discourse. To the extent that indigenous
peoples appeal to the legal system-as they often must--or to principles
of legality-as they often will choose to-they may be faced repeatedly
with the problem that the language in which they are asked to speak is
unsuitable for the topics they wish to address. In a sense, indigenous
peoples often will be attempting to translate their experiences into a language constructed by, and out of the experiences of, the Western cultures
that were in part the agents causing their difficulties. Translation is not
impossible, of course, but it almost certainly distorts the underlying experience, as Torres and Milun show. And to the extent that even successful
translations are distortions, appeals by indigenous peoples-and perhaps
by peoples whose cultures are not as completely Eurocentric as that of
the dominant majority in the United States, as Gary Peller's essay Race
ConsciousnessI8 suggests-may perhaps have a self-limiting quality.
The amount of limitation, though, itself can be changed. I am hesitant to believe that people, or cultures, can be truly "bilingual" in a way
that makes translation unnecessary. At the same time, however, I do not
doubt that people and cultures can influence each other, thus increasing
the degree to which each is partially bilingual, and thereby reducing the
amount of inaccuracy in translation. Notice, though, that my claim here
is about mutual influence; neither indigenous people nor invaders will be
the same after the contact. Peller's essay suggests that at least as a strategic matter, it might make sense for the black community in the United
States to promote a form of internal development that historically has
been criticized by many whites and blacks as a bad form of race consciousness. 19 Yet, because of the inevitability of mutual influence, I remain skeptical about the permanent utility of the program suggested in
Peller's essay, though less skeptical about its temporary pragmatic political utility.
What is at stake, I think, is the possibility of the transformation of
and within the legal tradition of rights. I believe that Peller's essay contains more than a little of what Duncan Kennedy refers to in passing as
the sentimentalizing of African-American culture. Yet, Peller's essay
provides an appropriate context for Kennedy's discussion, in A Cultural
17.
POL. &
18.
19.

For my most recent foray, see Tushnet, Rights: An Essay in Informal PoliticalTheory, 17
Soc'y 403 (1989).
1990 DUKE L.J. - (forthcoming FrontiersIII).
Id.
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PluralistCasefor Affirmative Action in Legal Academia,20 of the ideology
of colorblind meritocracy. Much of what Kennedy says is an entirely
sensible and quite moderate argument that the legal academy's standards
of merit are strikingly narrow, and that much would be gained if the
academy adopted a more sensible standard of merit. Kennedy also argues that the reasons for the narrowness of the existing standards are
cultural and ideological, and necessarily so. This argument, too, is
hardly extreme. One of the many contributions of minority scholars to
the legal academy has been to allow these arguments to be made in this
form.
Another contribution, this one made by feminist scholars as well,
has been to open up discussion of some issues that had been taken as
closed by many liberals. The dialogue between Charles Lawrence, in his
article If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,2 1 and Nadine Strossen in Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A
Modest Proposal?,22 deepens the understanding of the first amendment as
it operates in contemporary society. Jack Balkin, in Some Realism About
Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the FirstAmendment, 23 provides
the jurisprudential and historical context in which current controversies
among liberals over the proper interpretation of the first amendment
have arisen. Balkin argues that the analytic techniques that liberals have
inherited from the Legal Realists make it quite difficult to sustain the
kind of first amendment fundamentalism that most of us associate with
Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas.
Lawrence's essay works out, in a particularly important practical
and doctrinal context, the maneuvers that Balkin identifies in the more
abstract context of jurisprudence. This combination of doctrinal and
theoretical analysis places much of what Strossen says under rather severe stress-with one, for me, decisive exception. Strossen emphasizes,
in a way that Lawrence does not, that regulations of racist speech on
campus are to be administered by the very authorities who, if such regulations are adopted, will have been dragged into the regulations kicking
and screaming. She is in my view rightly skeptical about the proposition
that these people would administer the regulations in a way that Lawrence would find satisfying. I concede that the political struggle that
would lead to the adoption of the regulations might transform the sensibilities and inclinations of campus administrators. But, in that political
process concessions will inevitably be made to what opponents of regula20.
21.
22.
23.

199Q DUKE
1990 DUKE
1990 DUKE
1990 DUKE

L.J. L.J. L.J. L.J. -

(forthcoming
(forthcoming
(forthcoming
(forthcoming

FrontiersIII).
FrontiersII).
FrontiersII).
FrontiersII).
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tion will characterize as first amendment values, as Lawrence himself
indicates. Those concessions, I believe, are likely both to limit the impact
of the regulations, as Katharine Bartlett and Jean O'Barr suggest in The
Chilly Climate on College Campuses: An Expansion of the "'HateSpeech"
Debate,24 and to reduce the transformative impact of the political struggle on campus administrators.
The debate over regulation of racist speech on campus may not yet
have produced dramatic changes in the regulations in place or the atmosphere on campuses, but it has already transformed the academic discussion of the first amendment. Leslie Bender's article, Feminist (Re)Torts:
Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities,25 offers another perspective on the possibility of change within, and
therefore change of, the legal tradition of rights. Beginning with the insight that much of the discussion of the so-called tort liability "crisis"
has a tone reminiscent of some discussions of rape in which the focus
becomes whether the victim should be blamed, Bender expands our understanding of the "crisis" by drawing on feminist theory. A critique of
rights, or of what she calls the "ethic of rights," is at the heart of her
essay. She contributes to the historicizing project through her analysis of
the way the "public/private" distinction works in discussions of the "crisis" of the tort system. In addition, she sketches a program of transformation, based on feminist thought, that would supplement, or perhaps
ultimately displace, the tort system's reliance on an ethic of rights and
monetary compensation.
From one perspective,2 6 the feminist theories on which Bender relies
have provided new metaphors, made vital by their connection to a substantial political movement, for ideas about empowerment once associated with movements that have lost vitality.2 7 From a more traditional
perspective, some of her suggestions may disturb-which is as it should
be. Bender's attention to the possibility that tortfeasors should engage in
personal service to the injured-or, as has been suggested, that the chairman of the board of Exxon should join the people attempting to cleanse
the shoreline of the oil discharged by the Exxon Valdez-forces on us a
reconsideration of notions of liberty that ignore the connections between
24. 1990 DuKE L.J. -

(forthcoming FrontiersII).
25. Bender, supra note 14.
26. Which, as feminists have shown, may itself be limited.
27. Bender's notion of empowerment is, it seems to me, not all that different from "Power to
the People" or even "All Power to the Soviets" (where, as was meant in the initial formulation,
"soviet" referred to a collective form of social organization rather than to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
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the exercise's of one person's liberty (to dump oil and the like) and the
28
protections others have of their forms of life.
Whether that reconsideration would lead us to adopt a new form of
responsibility, however, might be questioned. The situation in Japan is
suggestive. There, anecdote has it, officials high in the hierarchy of corporations that damage the environment apologize personally to the individual victims of their companies' torts. Even so, one would not want to
offer Japan as an exemplar of a legal system truly committed to protection of the environment or of workers from injuries due to a corporation's pursuit of profit. Bender's suggestion, that is, may not be the best
remedy for the difficulties she identifies in our present tort system.
Yet, to conclude in that way would be misleading. For as I have
tried to suggest throughout this Introduction, one characteristic of these
essays and articles on the frontiers of legal thought is that they all participate in on-going political projects of transformation. By calling them
"projects," I mean to point out that they are implicated in a dynamic
process of social change, and the dynamics of the process may give meaning (as yet incompletely understood) to the particular suggestions for reform that the authors have devised. That is, we would go wrong if we
simply thought about what the tort system would look like if Bender's
suggestions about allocation of burdens and personal service were simply
inserted into a scheme that was otherwise unchanged. For those suggestions to be adopted, much would already have to have changed in the
way we think about torts, and the conceptual changes we would already
have undergone would themselves change the way in which we would
relate Bender's suggestions to, for example, ideas about liberty.
I conclude by returning to American Legal Realism. After completing their task of logical deconstruction, the initial Realists turned to a
sort of common sense social theory, under the label of policy analysis, to
replace the logical formalism they had abandoned. The revival of Realism has shown, I think, that small scale or common sense social theory
does not offer a satisfactory solution to the intellectual problems Realism
posed. As I have tried to suggest, in the end we are driven to large scale
social theories that deal with overall social transformation. That, of
course, may be the largest frontier of all, and the essays here move us
deeper into that territory.

28. Bender, supra note 14.

